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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
JAMES R. WHITEHEAD, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20001150-CA 
Priority No. 2 
NATURE OF TH]E PROCEEDINGS AND JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction1 for Aggravated Assault, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (l)(b) (1999), in the Third 
Judicial District Court, State of lUtah, the Honorable Joseph C. Fratto, Jr., Judge, 
presiding. 
Jurisdiction is conferredlupon this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-
3(2)(e)(1996). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE 
Did the trial court err in|denying the motion of Appellant James R. Whitehead 
["Mr. Whitehead"] to dismiss wnere there is insufficient evidence to convict him of 
Aggravated Assault? 
1
 A copy of the "Criminall Judgment and Sentence," R. 75, is attached in Addendum A. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENT 
"When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a conviction, [this 
Court] will reverse the conviction only when the evidence, viewed in the light most 
favorable to the verdict, 'is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that the defendant committed 
the crime of which he was convicted/" State v. Ouada, 918 P.2d 883, 887 (Utah Ct. App. 
1996) (quoting State v. Marcum. 750 P.2d 599, 601 (Utah 1988)). Accord State v. 
Brown. 853 P.2d 851, 860 (Utah 1992). 
This issue is preserved on the record at R. 90 [162-63]. 
RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following statues are relevant on appeal. Utah Code Annotated section 76-5-
103 provides: 
(1) A person commits aggravated assault if he commits assault as defined in 
Section 76-5-102 and he: 
(a) intentionally causes serious bodily injury to another; or 
(b) under circumstances not amounting to a violation of Subsection 
(l)(a), uses a dangerous weapon as defined in Section 76-1-601 or 
other means or force likely to produce death or serious bodily injury. 
(2) A violation of Subsection (l)(a) is a second degree felony. 
(3) A violation of Subsection (l)(b) is a third degree felony. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999). 
2 
Utah Code Annotated sedtion 76-5-102 provides: 
(1) Assault is: 
(a) an attempt, with unlawful force or violence, to do bodily injury to another; 
(b) a threat, accompanied by a show of immediate force or violence, to do 
bodily injury to another; or 
(c) an act, committed With unlawful force or violence, that causes or creates a 
substantial risk of bodily injury to another. 
(2) Assault is a class B mlisdemeanor. 
(3) Assault is a class A niisdemeanor if the person causes substantial bodily injury 
to another. 
(4) It is not a defense agalinst assault, that the accused caused serious bodily injury 
to another. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1*9). 
Utah Code Annotated section 76-2-102 provides: 
Every offense not 
and when the definition of the 
offense does not involve strict 1 
establish criminal responsibility 
defining the offense clearly 
responsibility for commission 
proof of any culpable mental 
involving strict liability shall require a culpable mental state, 
qffense does not specify a culpable mental state and the 
ability, intent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to 
. An offense shall involve strict liability if the statute 
indicates a legislative purpose to impose criminal 
qf the conduct prohibited by the statute without requiring 
st&te. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-102 (1S|99). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Mr. Whitehead was chaijged by information with Aggravated Assault, a third 
degree felony, in violation of Lltah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1999). R. 2-4. An arrest 
3 
warrant was issued, R. 1, and Mr. Whitehead was tried before a jury. R. 90 [4]. After all 
of the evidence was presented, Mr. Whitehead made a motion to dismiss. R. 90 [162-63]. 
He argued that, while the evidence may support a finding of negligence, it would not 
support a finding that he recklessly, intentionally, or knowingly shot the alleged victim, 
Lindsay Moore ["Ms. Moore"]. Id. The trial court denied the motion, stating: 
[I]t is a difficult matter, but I - if I understand the law correctly, which is 
that if one shows a reckless state of mind, that that would be sufficient 
rather than intentional - intending to shoot Ms. Moore. I think the State has 
met their burden at this point showing a prima facie case, and submit that to 
the Jury. 
R. 90 [163]. The jury convicted Mr. Whitehead as charged. R. 71. Mr. Whitehead filed a 
timely Notice of Appeal. R. 76-77. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The facts of this case are largely uncontested. On the evening of Friday, August 
20th, 1999 Mr. Whitehead was parked outside of Mr. Billiards pool hall with a friend, 
"Mike Cabrous." R.90 [136]. Shortly before 10 p.m. Nichol Vigil ["Ms. Vigil"], an 
acquaintance of Mr. Whitehead's, approached him and asked for a light for her cigarette. 
R. 90 [57, 138]. Ms. Vigil was accompanied by her friend, Lindsay Moore ["Ms. 
Moore"]. R. 90 [57, 140-41]. Mr. Whitehead had seen Ms. Moore once before at Mr. 
Billiards, but he had never spoken with her. R. 90 [38-39]. After Ms. Vigil lit her 
cigarette, she began "cuddling up" with Mr. Whitehead and talking about her ex-
boyfriend. R. 90 [66-67, 138]. Ms. Vigil was angry with her ex-boyfriend and "wanted to 
4 
hurt him." R. 90 [58]. She apparently felt unsafe with him. R. 90 [142-43]. Mr. 
Whitehead wrapped his arms around Ms. Vigil's waist as the two stood in the open 
driver's side door of Mr. Whitehead's truck. R. 90 [41-42, 141-42]. Ms. Moore stood 
three or four feet away near the rear wheel well, R. 90 [41, 141, 158-59], and Mike stood 
further away on the curb. R. 90 [29, 140-41]. 
Mr. Whitehead suggested that Ms. Vigil learn how to shoot a gun in order to feel 
safe. R. 90 [143]. He reached under the seat of his truck and took out his .9 mm 
Parabellum handgun. R. 90 [90-P1, 143].2 He ejected the magazine, or clip, and pulled 
the slide back. R. 90 [31]. A bullet ejected and dropped to the ground. R. 90 [31-32]. Ms. 
Vigil said "There goes your bullet. Don't lose it." R. 90 [61]. Mr. Whitehead picked up 
the bullet and put it back into the clip, which was already loaded with other bullets. R. 90 
[62]. Then he put the clip back In the gun. R. 90 [32]. He racked the slide back to make 
sure that a bullet had not loadedl into the chamber, and then he let the slide fall forward. 
R. 90 [62, 153-54]. At this point the gun was cocked.3 Mr. Whitehead attempted to 
"decock"4 the gun. R. 90 [143, 160]. He turned to the side and pointed the gun 
2
 Mr. Whitehead was intending to get a Concealed Weapons Permit and had completed a 
course on gun handling and safety i shortly before the accident. R. 90 [147-48]. 
3
 When a loaded gun is codked, or when the hammer is back, it can be fired by pulling the 
trigger. R. 90 [104]. The hammer will fall forward and hit the firing pin, which strikes the 
primer, which explodes and ignite? the gun powder, which expands the gases inside the gun and 
forces the bullet out. Id. 
4
 If a loaded gun is "decoctked 
essentially lowering the hammer sp 
enough force to fire the gun. R. 9Q 
it will not fire. R. 90 [108]. "Decocking" a gun is 
that it cannot fall forward and strike the firing pin with 
[104-05, 108-09]. 
5 
"underneath the truck. And in that general area over by [Ms. Moore]." R. 90 [63]. He 
placed his thumb under the hammer and pulled the trigger. R. 90 [63-64, 143-44]. 
However, his thumb slipped and the gun discharged. R. 90 [144]. 
The bullet apparently ricocheted and hit Ms. Moore in the leg, R. 90 [36, 63],5 
entering just above her knee cap and becoming lodged inside. R. 90 [36-37].6 Ms. Vigil 
knelt down to comfort Ms. Moore, and Mr. Whitehead found a blanket for her. R. 90 [64, 
72]. Mr. Whitehead "drew just a blank after tha t . . . . " R. 90 [144]. When Officer Shalae 
DeJarnatt ["Officer DeJarnatt"] arrived shortly thereafter, she discovered Ms. Moore 
lying on the ground surrounded by people. R. 90 [77]. Mr. Whitehead was standing near 
the open door of his truck, hunched over. R. 90 [77]. His hands and arms were shaking 
uncontrollably. R. 74 [2], 90 [82]. He would not respond to Officer DeJarnatt's questions 
or commands. R. 90 [78]. Eventually, Officer DeJarnatt began using one and two-word 
commands such as "come here" and "sit here." R. 90 [78]. Mr. Whitehead responded to 
those commands, and another officer helped him into a patrol car. R. 90 [84]. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Mr. Whitehead's conviction for third degree felony Aggravated Assault should be 
5
 The evidence fully supports that this shooting was accidental. Ms. Moore and Ms. Vigil 
both testified that no angry words were exchanged between Mr. Whitehead and Ms. Moore. R. 
90 [47, 73]. The State stipulated at trial that Mr. Whitehead had been attempting to release the 
hammer without "dry firing" the gun. R. 90 [160]. Further, Mr. Whitehead thought Ms. Moore 
had moved away when he pointed the weapon towards the ground. R. 90 [154]. 
6
 The bullet was removed the following day by surgery. R. 90 [37]. 
6 
reversed because it is not supported by sufficient evidence that he acted intentionally, 
knowingly, or recklessly. The State conceded at trial that Mr. Whitehead did not act 
intentionally or knowingly, R. 9P [169-70], and the evidence does not support that he 
acted recklessly. A person acts recklessly "when he is aware of but consciously 
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk . . . , " which is "of such a nature and degree 
that its disregard constitutes a gipss deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary 
person would exercise " Ut^ h Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (1999). A "gross deviation" 
is "an extreme deviation" from the ordinary standard of care. State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 
1182, 1184 (Utah 1981). 
Here, Mr. Whitehead did mot deviate in an extreme manner from the ordinary 
standard of care which a reasonaible person would exercise. When he pulled his gun out 
from under his car seat and recognized that it was loaded, he immediately took the clip 
out and removed the bullet fromithe chamber. R. 90 [31-32]. Then, after replacing the 
clip, he checked the chamber to determine whether a bullet had been loaded. R. 90 [62, 
153-54]. At this point, the gun was cocked, and he attempted to decock it by pulling the 
trigger and easing the hammer djown with his thumb. R. 90 [63, 143-44]. Although he 
thought he was pointing the gun|in a safe direction, R. 90 [154], Ms. Moore was was 
accidentally shot. R. 90 [63-64]. While this sequence of acts may have been negligent, it 
did not amount to recklessness because Mr. Whitehead did not "'perceive a risk and 
consciously disregard it,'" as required for a finding of recklessness. State v. Singer. 815 
P.2d 1303, 1307 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quoting State v. Dves. 671 P.2d 142, 148 (Utah 
7 
1983)). 
Further, in cases where the appellate courts of this State have upheld a finding of 
recklessness, the defendants' deviations from ordinary standards of care have been much 
more flagrant than Mr. Whitehead's actions with his gun. In State v. McElhaney the 
defendant had a hostile exchange with the victim and then threw a drinking glass in his 
face, causing severe lacerations. State v. McElhaney. 579 P.2d 328 (Utah 1978). In State 
v. Johnson the defendant struck the victim after the victim stood in his way when he tried 
to leave a cafe after fighting with his wife. State v. Johnson, 185 P.2d 738, 740 (Utah 
1947). Finally, in State v. Singer, the defendant shot at police service dogs knowing that 
officers were in close range. Singer, 815 P.2d at 1308. 
Mr. Whitehead's actions do not amount to a flagrant, conscious violation of 
ordinary safety standards and the element of recklessness is not supported in this case. 
Thus, Mr. Whitehead's conviction should be reversed. 
ARGUMENT 
BECAUSE THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT EVIDENCE THAT MR 
WHITEHEAD INTENTIONALLY, KNOWINGLY. OR RECKLESSLY 
SHOT MS, MOORE. HIS CONVICTION FOR THIRD DEGREE FELONY 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT SHOULD BE REVERSED 
Mr. Whitehead's conviction for third degree felony Aggravated Assault is not 
supported by the requisite intent because, at most, he acted negligently in decocking his 
handgun and accidently shooting Ms. Moore. To convict Mr. Whitehead of third degree 
8 
felony Aggravated Assault, the $tate must show, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. 
Whitehead intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly, Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103(l)(b) 
(1999); State v. McElhanev. 579 P.2d 328, 329 (Utah 1978), committed an assault7 with a 
dangerous weapon.8 Mere negligence or accident cannot support a conviction for 
Aggravated Assault.9 Nor can criminal negligence support a conviction for Aggravated 
Assault10 
In this case, the State conceded at trial that Mr. Whitehead did not intentionally11 
or knowingly12 shoot Ms. Moorei. R. 90 [169-70]. The record supports this concession. 
When Ms. Moore was shot, Mr. Whitehead was attempting to decock his gun, not fire it. 
7
 An assault is defined as "in act, committed with unlawful force or violence, that causes 
of creates a substantial risk of bodijy injury to another." Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1999). 
(1999). 
A handgun is considered a| dangerous weapon. Utah Code Ann. § 76-1-601 (5)(a) 
9
 See State v. Royball.710 
criminally responsible for assault W 
knowing or reckless."); Charles E. 
course, there is no criminal battery 
result of ordinary negligence or 
defendant's performance of an 
2d 168, 170 (Utah 1985) ("Royball could be found 
ith a deadlly weapon if his actions were either intentional, 
iTorcia, Wharton's Criminal Law § 178 (15th ed. 1994) ("Of 
for involuntary manslaughter) if the injury (or death) was the 
accident, unless the injury (or death) resulted from the 
unlawful act.")(footnotes omitted)). 
10
 See McElhanev, 579 P.2d| at 328 ("[U]nder 76-5-103(l)(b) no culpable mental state is 
specified and thus under 76-2-102 i^ntent, knowledge, or recklessness shall suffice to establish 
criminal responsibility.'") 
11
 A person acts intentionallV 
the conduct or cause the result." Urah 
"when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in 
i Code Ann. § 76-2-103(1) (1999). 
12
 A person acts knowingly 1'when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing 
circumstances. A person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with respect to a result of his 
conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result." Utah Code 
Ann. §76-2-103(2) (1999). 
9 
R. 90 [161]. Because he did not intend to discharge the bullet, he could not have 
intentionally or knowingly shot Ms. Moore. Furthermore, he had no reason to shoot Ms. 
Moore. He had seen her only one time previously, R. 90 [38-39], and had never spoken 
with her beyond a casual introduction. R. 90 [67]. He did not have an argument or 
altercation with her, R. 90 [47], and he had no reason to be angry with her. R. 90 [43]. 
Therefore, the principal issue in this case is not whether Mr. Whitehead acted 
intentionally or knowingly, but whether he acted recklessly. 
The circumstances of the accident indicate that Mr. Whitehead acted, at most, 
negligently, and his conviction for Aggravated Assault is not supported by evidence of 
recklessness. A person acts recklessly: 
with respect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his 
conduct when he is aware of but consciously disregards a substantial and 
unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the result will occur. The 
risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a 
gross deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person would 
exercise under all the circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (1999). The Utah Supreme Court has pointed out that the 
common sense meaning of the term "gross deviation" in this statute is "an extreme 
deviation. In other words, the deviation is beyond minor or even substantial in its 
divergence; it is extreme." State v. Owens, 638 P.2d 1182, 1184 (Utah 1981). Evidence 
of this extreme deviation must be sufficient to prove the defendant guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State v. Petree. 659 P.2d 443, 445 (Utah 1983). While the evidence and 
all inferences which may reasonably be drawn from it must be regarded in the light most 
10 
favorable to the jury's verdict, S^ate v. Singer. 815 P.2d 1303, 1306 (Utah 1991), a 
reviewing court cannot "take a speculative leap across a remaining gap in order to sustain 
a verdict. The evidence, stretched to its utmost limits, must be sufficient to prove the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt." Petree, 659 P.2d at 445. 
In this case, recklessness s^ not proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Central to the 
issue is whether Mr. Whitehead Is actions in disarming his gun, replacing the clip, and 
attempting to decock his gun constitute an extreme deviation from the standard of care an 
ordinary person would exercise. |Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-103(3) (1999). A close 
examination of these actions indicates that Mr. Whitehead did not deviate in an extreme 
manner from an ordinary standard of care. 
First, Mr. Whitehead rempved the clip and ejected a bullet from the chamber of 
his gun. R. 90 [32, 61]. He asked Ms. Vigil whether she wanted to hold the gun, and she 
declined. R. 90 [143]. He retrieved the bullet from where it had fallen on the ground, and 
placed it in the clip. R. 90 [32, 61]. He replaced the clip and racked the slide back "just 
far enough where I thought I coijld look into it and make sure that it was not loaded 
again." R. 90 [153]. Then he let the slide fall forward. R. 90 [62, 154]. At this point, the 
gun was cocked. R. 90 [153-54]. Mr. Whitehead pointed the gun towards the ground, 
underneath his truck, placed his ^humb under the hammer to keep the gun from firing, 
and pulled the trigger. R. 90 [63, 143-44]. However, his thumb slipped, R. 90 [144], and 
Ms. Moore was shot. R. 90 [144]|. 
This sequence of events sfrows that Mr. Whitehead made reasonable efforts to 
11 
comply with ordinary rules of safety. His first action after recognizing that he was 
holding a loaded gun was to disarm it. After replacing the clip in the gun, he checked the 
chamber again to ensure that a bullet had not loaded into the chamber. Then, realizing 
that this action itself may have loaded a bullet, R. 90 [152-53], he attempted to decock 
the gun, thereby making it safe again. 
Because it is Mr. Whitehead's unsuccessful attempt at decocking his gun that 
directly led to the accident, the decocking method which he used, and whether he was 
reckless in using it, is critical. The testimony of Frank Randazzo ["Mr. Randazzo"], who 
teaches a Basic Concealed Carry Course sponsored by the State, R. 90 [115], is helpful 
here. Mr. Whitehead took Mr. Randazzo's course four months prior to the accident.13 In 
that course, Mr. Randazzo taught the students how to decock a variety of guns. R. 90 
[129]. Some guns are decocked without squeezing the trigger, but other guns have 
hammers that cannot be released unless the trigger is squeezed. R. 90 [127-28]. When the 
hammer must be released by squeezing the trigger, Mr. Randazzo teaches students to 
place two thumbs on the hammer, squeeze the trigger with one finger, and then slowly 
ease the hammer down with the thumb. R. 90 [128]. The gun should be pointed in a safe 
direction, either upwards into the air or downwards towards the asphalt. R. 90 [130-31]. 
In this case, Mr. Whitehead substantially followed Mr. Randazzo's instructions. 
He pointed the gun downwards, underneath his truck. R. 90 [63]. Then he attempted to 
13
 Mr. Whitehead took the course on 25 April 1999, R. 90 [118], and the accident took 
place on 20 August 1999. R. 90 [25]. 
12 
decock his gun using only one ttiumb on the hammer, and his "thumb slipped." R. 90 
[144-45]. Two peculiar characteristics of his gun contributed to this accident. According 
to State Firearms Examiner David Wakefield ["Mr. Wakefield"], Mr. Whitehead's 
handgun has an unusually strong trigger, requiring large amounts of pressure to pull it 
back,14 but a very short pull length, meaning that the gun would fire very soon after 
pulling commenced. R. 90 [102]| In other words, a person decocking the gun would have 
to pull unusually hard on the trigger, and then the hammer would fall forward sooner than 
expected, possibly catching the p|erson off-guard. Mr. Whitehead had owned the gun for 
less than eight months and was unfamiliar with it. R. 90 [147-48]. 
In these circumstances, th<p evidence does not support that Mr. Whitehead acted 
recklessly. At most, he acted negligently because he used only one thumb, rather than 
two, to decock his gun. However j this slight variation from Mr. Randazzo's instruction is 
not a "gross" or extreme deviatioh from the standard of care that an ordinary person 
would use. Mr. Whitehead otherwise followed the decocking procedure accurately, and 
the element of recklessness is not| supported. 
The record does not contaijn any contrary evidence. The evidence, fully marshaled 
to support a finding of recklessness, is as follows: 
* The gun was loaded wheh Mr. Whitehead pulled it out from under the seat of the 
truck. R. 90 [31, 151]. 
14
 Semiautomatic handguns silich as Mr. Whitehead's typically have a trigger strength 
measured around seven to eight pounds. R. 90 [101]. Mr. Whitehead's gun, however, had a 
trigger strength measured at between! eleven and thirteen pounds. IcL 
13 
* After removing the bullet from the chamber, Mr. Whitehead placed the bullet 
into the clip and placed the clip back in the gun. R. 90 [69]. 
* Mr. Whitehead attempted to decock the gun using only one finger instead of two 
as taught by Mr. Randazzo in his Basic Concealed Carry Course. R. 90 [145]. 
* Ms. Moore was standing in the general area where Mr. Whitehead pointed the 
gun to decock it, and she had been standing there for ten or fifteen minutes even though 
Mr. Whitehead thought she had moved. R. 90 [48, 154]. The evidence indicates that a 
light post provided light in the parking lot, but it was after dark and there were shadows. 
R. 90 [39-40]. 
* Mr. Whitehead had learned the three basic rules of gun safety in Mr. Randazzo's 
class. R. 90 [149-50]. The first rule is "always keep your gun pointed in a safe direction." 
R. 90 [117]. The second rule is "always keep your finger off the trigger until you are 
ready to shoot." Id. An exception to the second rule may be made when the trigger must 
be pulled in order to release the hammer. R. 90 [128]. The third rule is "always keep your 
gun unloaded until you are ready to use it." R. 90 [117]. 
This evidence does not demonstrate that Mr. Whitehead acted recklessly because it 
does not indicate that Mr. Whitehead perceived a risk but consciously disregarded it by 
deviating to an extreme degree from the ordinary standard of care. In fact, it demonstrates 
Mr. Whitehead's attempt to improve his personal standard of care by attending Mr. 
Randazzo's safety course, which included instruction on the three basic safety rules. R. 
14 
90 [148-50]. His effort to leant these rules should not be recompensed by automatic 
criminal liability for minor deviations from the rules. As Mr. Randazzo testified, most 
safety rules can vary depending upon the circumstances, the type of gun, or even the 
nature of the safety course beingf taught, R. 90 [117, 128], and Mr. Whitehead has had 
various prior experiences with gjuns and gun safety. R. 90 [149]. Therefore, common 
sense as well as the applicable cfrse law16 indicates that Mr. Whitehead's adherence to a 
reasonable standard of care shoiild be examined on the basis of how an ordinary person 
would act, and not whether safety rules were followed with textbook correctness. 
Significantly, "recklessness" is a more culpable mental state than mere negligence 
or even criminal negligence, and the evidence marshaled above does not establish 
recklessness. The difference between recklessness and criminal negligence was set out by 
the Utah Supreme Court in Statq v. Singer, and is as follows: 
The only difference between reckless and criminally negligent conduct is 
that under the former, on0 perceives a risk and consciously disregards it, 
whereas under the latter, 0ne fails to even perceive the risk. The risk in both 
cases must be of such a degree that an ordinary person would not disregard 
or fail to recognize it. The distinction, then, is merely one of the degree of 
perception of the risk. 
Singer. 815 P.2d at 1307 (quoting Dyer, 671 P.2d at 148). 
In this case, there is nothing to indicate that Mr. Whitehead consciously 
disregarded the risk to Ms. Mooije in the way that he handled his gun. He complied with 
15
 Mr. Whitehead attended the course to comply with the State's requirements for 
handling a concealed weapon. R. 9(1) [148]. 
16
 Singer, 815 P.2d at 1307; (Owens, 638 P.2d at 1184. 
15 
the third safety rule taught by Mr. Randazzo, "always keep your gun unloaded until you 
are ready to use it," R. 90 [117], by removing the clip from his gun and the bullet from 
the chamber immediately after he realized the gun was loaded. R. 90 [60, 151-52].17 
Later, after replacing the clip, his first action was to check the chamber to ensure that a 
round had not chambered. R. 90 [153-54]. These actions indicate that Mr. Whitehead was 
attempting to comply with the third rule of safety in a reasonable manner. While he may 
not have complied perfectly because the clip had bullets inside when he replaced it, R. 90 
[62], and because he knew that pulling the slide back far enough would chamber a bullet, 
R. 90 [152-53], he did not make an extreme deviation from the third rule. His intent in 
pulling the slide back was to open it just enough to check the chamber, R. 90 [153-54], 
and as an added precaution he attempted to decock the gun. R. 90 [161]. These actions do 
not constitute an extreme deviation from the ordinary standard of care which a reasonable 
person would exercise. 
With regard to the second safety rule, "always keep your finger off the trigger 
until you are ready to shoot," R. 90 [117], Mr. Whitehead was exercising an exception to 
the rule when he attempted to decock the gun by pulling the trigger to release the 
hammer. R. 90 [128]. As Mr. Randazzo testified, some guns have hammers which are 
released only by pulling the trigger, and an exception applies. R. 90 [128-29]. Mr. 
Randazzo had demonstrated this method of decocking in his class, R. 90 [129-30], and 
17
 There is nothing in the record to indicate how the gun came to be loaded, why it was 
loaded, or whether Mr. Whitehead had been practicing with it shortly beforehand. 
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this is the method that Mr. Whitehead was using to decock his gun. R. 90 [143-45,161]. 
With regard to the first safety rule, "always keep your gun pointed in a safe 
direction," R. 90 [117], Mr. Whitehead did not make a conscious deviation from the rule. 
It was after dark and shadowy, R. 90 [39-40], and he did not point the gun directly at Ms. 
Moore, but underneath his truck] R. 90 [63, 155]. Although this action may constitute 
negligence because Ms. Moore Was, in fact, accidentally shot, this does not constitute a 
gross deviation from the safety rule. Testimonies of all of the witnesses verify that this 
shooting was an accident, and ncf conscious disregard of the risk to Ms. Moore is 
indicated. See R. 90 [43] (Ms. Moore testifies that Mr. Whitehead had no reason to be 
angry with her and did not knowlher); 90 [63] (Ms. Vigil testifies that Mr. Whitehead 
pointed the gun down at the ground, in the direction of his truck); 90 [146, 154] (Mr. 
Whitehead indicates he was not 4ngry with Ms. Moore, and he didn't see her when he 
pointed the gun because he was looking directly at the ground); 90 [82] (Mr. Whitehead 
was "'slouched and shaking in the open door of the truck9" when the first police officer 
arrived on the scene). 
Additionally, in cases where courts have ruled that the mental element of 
recklessness was supported, the evidence has indicated a much more extreme deviation 
from the standard of ordinary care than that at issue here. In State v. McElhaney the Utah 
Supreme Court found that the defendant acted recklessly in throwing a drinking glass and 
striking the victim in the face, causing severe lacerations. McElhaney. 579 P.2d at 328. 
The evidence indicated that the d0fendant and victim were standing close together and 
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that the defendant and others had been planning to take the victim to a nearby river to 
"overhaul" him. IdL In State v. Johnson the Court refused to excuse an unintended 
homicide which was the result of the defendant's reckless behavior. State v. Johnson, 185 
P.2d 738, 744-45 (Utah 1947). In that case, the defendant and his wife had slapped each 
other in a cafe, and the defendant had turned to leave the building. The victim was in his 
way, and the defendant fatally struck the victim. Id. at 740. The Court said, "[ojrdinary 
individuals just do not go around striking others without being challenged, exasperated, 
irritated, or provoked by some act of the person hit. If they were to do this, then no 
defense should be available to them." Id at 743. In State v. Singer this Court ruled that 
the defendant acted recklessly in firing his shotgun at police service dogs when he knew 
that officers were close by and that any shots missing the dogs were likely to strike the 
officers. Singer, 815 P.2d at 1308. 
As these cases indicate, a finding of recklessness is predicated upon some flagrant, 
conscious disregard of an ordinary standard of safety, and that did not occur in this case. 
There is nothing to show that Mr. Whitehead acted with consciousness of the risk to Ms. 
Moore, or that he acted with flagrant disregard to standards of safety which ordinary 
people would follow. Therefore, Mr. Whitehead's conviction is not supported by the 
requisite finding of intent. 
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CONCLUSION 
In light of the above, Mr. | Whitehead's conviction for Aggravated Assault should 
be reversed. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this //*&, day of June, 2001. 
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Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
KIMBERLY A. CLARK 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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